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Abstract
The European Union sugar policies, in place for over 49 years, underwent a first major reform in 2005,
yielding to mounting pressures coming from the EU 2004 enlargement, the recent EBA initiative to least
developed countries and the recent WTO-panel ruling on EU sugar export subsidies. The reform package
consists of lowering administrative prices as well as modifying the structure of production quotas leading to
lower sugar production and bringing down subsidized export to within WTO limits. However, these reforms
do not address other components of the EU sugar policies such as non-preferential tariffs, quota reallocation
across regions, or opening up the competitive structure of the EU sugar industry. This makes it difficult to
assess the economic and trade implications of the reform package. This paper offers a dual-modeling
approach to examine the impact of the EU sugar policy reform on sugar production and prices in the EU, and
the trade implications for third countries with particular distinction between preferential and non-preferential
exporters.
Key words: EU sugar policy, Sugar markets, Global sugar trade, General equilibrium model,
Partial equilibrium model
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the leading sugar producers and traders in the world.
However, much of EU sugar production and trade operate under heavy protective policies that
regulate production, prices, exports and imports. These policies continued unchanged since the
Common Market Organization (CMO) Sugar was created in 1968. The main elements of the CMO
sugar cover a range of market management tools, namely “intervention” and “minimum price for
sugar beet”; a system of national production quotas with “declassification” and “carry over”
mechanisms among the quota types; and other tools relevant to sugar used in alcohol and yeast
production, the isoglucose quota and the inuline syrup quota. Border measures include export
subsidies to dispose of excess supply, arrangements for preferential trade with third countries, and
high protective tariffs to protect domestic sugar against foreign competition.2
However, pressures have been building recently as high domestic prices generating excess
supply have become unsustainable, particularly in light of the EU 2004 enlargement, the expected
rise of imports from the ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative to least developed countries (LDC),
and a recent WTO panel ruling on EU sugar export subsidies. Moreover, the EU is also faced with
new commitments in tariff reductions as part of Doha Round negotiations, with the possible
abolition of the special safeguard clause.
Faced with these pressures and beginning in 2005, the EU agreed to replace the existing CMO
with a new sugar policy regime. The stated goals of the EU sugar reform is to ensure balance on the
internal market under more competitive circumstances. This includes bringing export subsidies in
line with WTO commitments and accommodating duty-free imports of EBA sugar (from 2009 and
onwards). The new policies include lower price support (36% cut in intervention price, from €631.9
to €404.4 per MT), restructuring production quotas with incentives for voluntary quota buyouts, and
compensation for farmers along the new CAP regime (equivalent to 64.2 percent of the price cut
paid out as a single farm payment). Moreover, out-of-quota sugar production can no longer be
exported. For non-sugar sweeteners, there is a quota increase for isoglucose by 300,000 MT for the
existing producer companies phased-in over three years. Moreover, soon after the EU sugar reform
was formally approved (by the Parliament, then the Council of Ministers), the EU Commission
decided to introduce a mandatory cut in the production quota for 2006/2007 of approximately 2.5
million tonnes (or 15%).
While the new regime represents a significant departure from existing policies, many
components of the EU sugar regime are unaffected making it difficult to assess the extent to which
the stated goals of narrowing the supply-demand imbalances can be achieved. Even with the support
price cuts sugar crops may still be more attractive compared to alternatives, while the high import
barriers will continue to shield the domestic sugar industry. The inabilty of quota holders to trade in3
quotas across states may restrict the degree of industry adjustment toward a greater cost efficiency
environment. Moreover, the possibility of substitution between sugar and alternative sweeteners
will continue to be restricted as the new isoglucose production quotas are still highly restrive
compared to a more competitive environment.
The domestic effect of EU reform is likely to be more significant than cross-border effects.
Under the current EU sugar regime, the principal mechanisms that determine domestic market
prices are not intervention buying (which is scarcely used) but rather the control over imports and
the disposal of excess supply through subsidized exports. This results in market prices sandwiched
within a price band with the floor set at intervention price while the ceiling is formed by the duty-
paid prices for non-preferential third country imports. Under perfect competition internally, prices
would be driven down to the price floor level.  In reality, prices rarely deviate from the price ceiling
and are consistently kept 10-15% above the intervention price (NEI, 2000; Swedish Competition
Authority, 2002) (see figure 2). A key reason behind this is that the EU sugar industry exercises
market power and acts in tacit collusion among processors where firms agree not to interfere outside
their designated markets (Swedish Competition Authority, 2002).
Under this monopolistic structure, sugar processing firms can charge a price that far exceeds
marginal costs, as long as other firms in the market (but operating in segmented submarkets) do the
same. The CMO Sugar has helped incumbent firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a number of
ways. First, regulation blocks non-preferential imports from outside the Union hence preventing
competition from extra-EU sugar. Second, regulations prevent entry of new firms by allocating
sugar quotas only to incumbent firms. Finally, the CMO Sugar severely restricts competition with
sugar substitutes such as isoglucose by limiting production quotas. To be sustainable, such tacit
collusion requires a retaliatory mechanism which is provided by export subsidies. This enables
firms to use the threat of shifting quantities from exports to domestic sales within the Union.4
Consequently, firms are deterred from deviating by the threat of a price war during a retaliatory
period, where all firms price at marginal cost and profits are low or zero for all firms.
Under the new policy regime it is not clear what the net effect on the industry competitive
behavior will be and how this will affect producers’ incentives. While the WTO-ruling on
subsidized exports might limit the industry’s tacit collusive behavior, the tendency toward processor
consolidation means that existing oligopolistic firm behavior is likely to persist with domestic prices
higher than otherwise warranted under greater inter-firm domestic competition. In such a case,
domestic prices may be kept consistently above the floor intervention price.
Also key to understanding the potential implications of cutting intervention price is the
relationship between market price and supply response, which is not adequately studied or
understood. Given the overlay of quota allocations, differential cost structures between regions,
price supports and the long run nature of the contracts between processors and growers for sugar
supply, it has been difficult to assess the EU sugar supply response and its relations with marginal
costs. The production quotas limit the competitive ability of efficient producers and create entry
barriers since sugar beet growers are tied to long term supply contracts with regional sugar
processors. Under a drop in price support, high cost producers producing only within the A-quota
could continue to produce as long as the quota rent (defined as the difference between received
price and marginal cost) is still positive. Supply response for low cost producers (who may supply
C-sugar in addition to A and B quota sugar) is in principle linked to world prices rather than to
domestic prices (Frandsen et al., 2003). However, this assumption implies that any changes in
intervention price will only bite into the quota rents without affecting production, an unreasonable
outcome at the EU-wide level. Gohin and Bureau (2005) argue that given the coexistence of quota
sugar (A and B) with out of quota sugar in some regions (C-sugar), and the presence of cross-
subsidization of C-sugar, the marginal cost for C-sugar is higher than the world price of sugar. This5
implies that any policy reform that reduces domestic support price will trigger a supply response
and not just changes in quota rents.
On the trade side, while EBA countries are expected to increase sugar shipment to EU after
2009, there is some uncertainty about the extent of import increase. Because of the “SWAPS”
1
provision in the EBA treaty, EBA members would be able to import sugar at world prices and then
export locally produced sugar to the EU. With lower intervention prices under the new reform,
some EU member states doubt that the EBA countries will be able to profitably export raw sugar to
the EU at the lower proposed institutional prices. Given this, how are sugar imports from
preferential and non-preferential sources likely to be affected by the EU sugar policy reform? And
what are the likely effects on world sugar prices?
To sort out these issues and to provide a formal assessment of the economic and trade impacts
of EU sugar policy change, a dual-modeling approach is used drawing from both partial equilibrium
and general equilibrium models. Properly specified quantitative models must reflect the complex
structure of the EU sugar regime bringing into the picture to the extent possible the quota
management structure, the complex price support regime, export subsidies, and the highly regulated
import flows dominated by preference-type imports. Given the complexity of the EU sugar regime
and the various interconnected issues to disentangle, there is no single economic model that can
adequately represent all these specifications. In this report, we apply two models: a partial
equilibrium (PE) model of agricultural trade (PEATSIM) which incorporates the main EU Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) instruments including EU sugar policies. The model also allows for
yearly baseline-type projections of changes in production, consumption and prices and the results
can be compared to comparable and commonly used PE models. The second model is a global CGE
                                                
1 “SWAPS” or “triangular trade” is a feature of the EBA treaty which enables LDCs to import agricultural
products from third countries for their domestic consumption in order to export their own domestic
production.6
model of trade and production (GTAP). The GTAP explicitly deals with various preferential trade
regimes and allows for a more complete representation of the global sugar trade on a bilateral basis.
Besides production and trade effects, the CGE model also provides a more complete economy-wide
welfare assessment of policy change. Moreover, the CGE model enables an analysis under
imperfect competition which more closely represent the market structure of the EU Sugar industry.
This paper is divided into the following sections. Section two offers an overview of the current
EU sugar policy regime and market implications. Section three presents the models. Section 4
describes the results and section 5 concludes.
An overview of the EU sugar market and policies
Sugar production in the EU is regulated via national sugar quotas based on historical production
levels, not on consumption needs.  The sugar quota allocated may be transferred between firms, but
not between member States. Two types of quotas are recognized: A-quota (83% of total, subject to
2% production levy of 2% of intervention price) and B-quota (17% of total, subject to up to 37.5%
of production levy to meet export subsidy costs). Sugar produced above and beyond A and B sugar
must be declassified and considered C-sugar. The over-quota production must be 'carried over' to
the next marketing year or exported without subsidies. However, exported C-sugar at world prices
is still profitable because the prices obtained for sales of quota sugar (A and B) are high enough to
cover all the fixed costs of the processing companies.  This cross-subsidization effect has been one
of the main arguments raised against the EU in the recent WTO ruling on EU export subsidies.
According to the WTO Appellate Body, total subsidized exports amount to almost 4 million tonnes
per year, which far exceeds the EU's WTO commitment limit (1.273 million MT).  Similarly, the
ruling also means that taking ACP sugar re-exports into account, the EU's spending on export7
subsidies is close to 1.3 billion € per year, compared to the official ceiling (and WTO notified
amount) of 499 million €.
In the EU, sugar external trade is highly managed principally through three instruments: export
subsidies, contractual agreements with third-countries as part of preferential agreements and high
import protection for non-preferential sugar. These policies regulating the two-way flow of sugar,
have placed the European Union in an unusual position of being both a significant importer and
exporter of sugar (figure 1). Export subsidies, which insure that processors receive the same price as
they would in domestic markets, are the key mechanisms to dispose of surplus production and
ensure domestic market balance. Subsidies are paid for sugar obtained from beet or cane harvested
in the EU and sugar imported under the ACP Protocol/Agreement with India. The sum of export
subsidies and world market price thus gives the producers close to € 67/100 kg exported sugar.
Given the wide gap between domestic and world prices, subsidies of the order of 75% of the EU
intervention price are currently needed to enable the quota surplus to be sold.
EU exports, subsidized directly and indirectly, average 6 million tonnes a year, or about 30% of
total world exports. Of these, an average 3.5 million tonnes of sugar (including sugar in processed
products) is exported with a direct export subsidy. In addition, The European Union subsidies the
re-export of 1.6 million tonnes of refined sugar from imported raw ACP sugar; bringing the total
volume of subsidized exports to more than 4 million tonnes.
The EU imports sugar through several bilateral or regional agreements. The ‘Sugar Protocol’
enables the EU to import cane-sugar under quotas from 19 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
countries which are exempt from duties and receive EU domestic prices for raw sugar (52.37 €/100
kg). Adding a separate agreement with India for 10,000 MT imports, the total imports under the
“Sugar protocol” amount to 1,304,700 MT. The Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) is an additional set8
of bilateral preferential agreements designed to fill the gap in meeting estimated national processing
needs. The SPS quota covers approximately 200,000 MT which can be imported duty free.
The Everything-but-arms (EBA) initiative was launched in 2001 whereby the EU agreed to offer
progressive duty-and quota-free access to exports from 48 countries among the least developed
countries (LDC). Amounts began with 74,185 tonnes in 2001 and increase by 15% annually until
2009, when free access will be allowed. This implies that more preferential imports would continue
to flow into the EU, especially from low cost countries such as Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan and
Mozambique. However, there is much uncertainty about the capacity of EBA countries to export
significant amounts of sugar to the EU. With the start of the EBA initiative, EBA imports have also
been counted as part of the SPS quota.
The EU also has a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) regime with the Balkan countries who can export
193,000 MT to the EU duty-free. Also under the Uruguay Round and as a result of the accession of
Finland, Austria and Sweden, the EU agreed to an MFN access quota covering 85,463 tonnes of raw
cane sugar for refining with reduced duties of 98 €/t and applying to Cuba (58,969 t) and Brazil
(23,930 t).  However, this sugar does not qualify for a price guarantee. Following the 2004
enlargement, the EU is also obligated to allocate “current access” quotas in the amount of 490,000
MT to third countries to compensate for the accession of ten new states from Eastern Europe.
Outside the preferential duties, border protection is in the form of a combination of two duties,
one fixed and one variable resulting from the application of the special safeguard (SS) clause. The
fixed duty is set for €419 per tonne for white sugar and €339 per tonne for raw sugar. The variable
duty under the special safeguard clause is linked to the trigger price set at 531 €/t for white sugar
and 418 €/t for raw sugar in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The special safeguard clause can
be applied whenever the world market price falls below the trigger price.  Because the EU9
negotiated a high trigger price for sugar in the Uruguay round, the safeguard clause and, hence, the
additional duty, have been applied permanently since 1995.
The high degree of protection from the combined fixed tariff plus special safeguard has reduced
non-preferential imports to the minimum. This can be seen in two ways. First average overall duty
was only 115 €/T in 2003 (87 €/T in 2002). Second, average annual imports of pure sugar at full
import duty (non-preferential) have been only 28 000 tonnes, compared to the total imports of 1.5
million tonnes and the annual EU consumption of 12.7 million tonnes.
The EU sugar reform’s stated aim is to facilitate reductions in EU sugar output, dampen
incentives of exports to EU from EBA countries, and reduce the subsidized sugar exports. The key
instruments targeted in the reform include a cut in intervention price by 36 percent (from €631.9 to
€404.4 per MT), coupled with a compensation to farmers (64.2 percent of the price cut). The current
quota system is streamlined (A and B combined) and voluntary buy out of quotas is offered for the
first few years. No exports of declassified sugar (C-sugar) will be permitted under the new regime
and to discourage production outside quota (“C-sugar”), a prohibitive super levy (similar to dairy)
will be applied. On top of this and outside the formal reform agreement, the EU Commission later
decided to cut the production quota for 2006/2007 by approximately 2.5 million t (or 15%). On the
border protection side, no change is envisioned in the reform program aside from reducing exports
and subsidies to WTO-limits and maintaining the existing international import commitments. Non-
preferential import duties (including the special safeguards) are not affected by the new regime.
Overall the EU continues to play a big role in world sugar markets, but much of its sugar
imports and exports are driven by policies and subsidies. Globally, sugar trade is marked by several
features including a regional character, the dichotomy between raw and refined sugar, and the
preponderance of trade impacted by policies and subsidies. Over 60% of trade takes place under
long term contracts, preferential agreements and with subsidies, while only 40% only is traded at10
world market prices. Within this global sugar situation, the EU plays a significant role in
influencing world prices, particularly white sugar, due to subsidy-enabled large export quantities of
sugar. Out of the total of 21.307 million MT white sugars exported worldwide, the EU exports over
6.412 million MT, and thus contributing to the downward pressure on world market price within the
narrow residual market segment.
Model and Analysis
Partial Equilibrium Model of Agricultural Trade: PEATSIM
The PEATSIM is a multi-commodity multi-region agricultural trade model. The PEATSIM is
partial equilibrium type model with net trade specification. This means that each region can either
be specified as net importer or exporter. In our case we treat EU as a net sugar importer since we are
most interested in import responses to EU sugar reform. Ideally, given that the EU is a major player
on both exports and importers, a two-way trade specification is preferred. But the model is not built
to handle such trade structure. Sugar production in the model is handled on raw sugar equivalent
basis and production is adjusted to include preferential imports (from ACP, India and Balkans). The
model specifies a support price in the form of reference price treated as intervention price. For the
import regime, import tariffs are based on two-tier tariffs using the ad valorem equivalent of
specific tariffs. Under the EU policy reform, sugar farm payments set equivalent to 64.2% of price
cuts are introduced into the model starting in 2006 and treated as decoupled payments. Following
the 2003 CAP reform, set aside payments are ignored given that their reallocation is linked to all
arable crops (and not just to Grandes cultures as before the 2003 CAP reform). Therefore, one
would expect little influence on production patterns.11
For supply management, the model is initially set so that the quota is equal to beginning
production. To model the impact of the reforms besides cutting intervention price by 36%, we set
the future target production quota to balance consumption, preferential imports and WTO-permitted
exports. For the baseline simulations, the desired domestic production is set to balance domestic
consumption, WTO-permitted exports, and preferential imports from ACP, India and Balkans. For
production quota, we implement a phased quota reduction in the reform scenario from 2006 to
2010. The desired quota level in 2010 is determined by taking into account the EU’s WTO export
commitment, preferential imports and domestic consumption. Therefore in the reform scenario with
PEATSIM we induce a target production quota cut that is not explicitly reflected in the reform law
but rather reflects the target production to achieve supply-demand balance under given assumption
of preferential imports. Moreover, we also “restraint” exports by preventing C-sugar from being
dumped on world markets; thus implicitly accounting for EU compliance with WTO ruling on
export subsidies.
Global CGE Model of Production and Trade: GTAP
The applied general equilibrium GTAP (Hertel, 1997) is a multi-region and multi-sector global
model of production and trade that follows the standard theoretical specifications of trade CGE
models. In this analysis we use a special version of GTAP that deal with imperfect competition and
oligopolistic behavior of firms (Francois, 1998; Elbehri and Hertel, 2004). The model distinguishes
between the sugar industry and the sugar beet/sugar cane crop sectors. Given the market structure of
the sugar industry and the collusive market power practices, the sugar processing activity is
modeled under oligopolistic competitive behavior with increasing returns to scale. This allows for
modeling separately cases with or without firm entry or exit and hence enables a separate
assessment between firm versus industry level production effects.12
Sugar production in the EU is also constrained by quota limits and the sugar production quota is
modeled under a complementary condition allowing for endogenous regime change from binding to
non-binding with associated quota rents expressed as tax equivalent. Sugar is treated on a raw sugar
equivalent basis and the sugar import regime is modeled as a system of bilaterally allocated import
quotas following the Armington specification. The model includes 28 regions, 14 of which  are EU
regions (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden,
UK, Hungary, Czech Rep, Other-EU) and 14 non-EU regions (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
China, India, Australia, Thailand, ACP, LDC, Mediterranean, Central America, Other-Asia, and rest
of world aggregate). Preferential imports are treated via bilateral tariff rate quotas for a specific set
of partners (ACP, India). Moreover, these preferential exporters are assumed to capture the quota
rents to mimic the fact that these countries receive guaranteed prices equivalent to domestic prices.
Results
Using the PEATSIM model, the EU sugar “reform scenario” is compared to an alternative “status
quo” scenario without reform. Under the “reform scenario” the intervention price is cut by 36%
while under the “status quo” scenario the expected impact of EBA imports induces lower domestic
prices and leads to downward adjustment of the intervention price (by 11%). The model baseline
under both scenarios is run from 2004 to 2009. However, being a net trade model, we do not
separate out EBA from non-EBA sugar imports into the EU. Rather import changes are gross
imports into the EU from all sources. Results are shown in Table 2.
Under the reform scenario, given the combined effect of cuts in intervention price and
production quota, EU sugar output is cut by 17.7% by 2009 (compared to the 2004 base). At the
same time we have an increase in consumption (by 8.9% over 5 year period or 1.7% annually) as
consumer prices are also reduced (-39.25%; see table 2, 3rd column). Despite a significant reduction13
in exports (-53.1%), imports also expand sharply by over 113.5% (from base) due to the
combination of reduced production and increased demand. Bringing more disciplines to exports (by
preventing non-subsidized exports) also dampens somewhat the influx of more imports in response
to price cuts.
Under the reform scenario, the world price over the period 2004-2009 rises by 8.04% compared
to the base (2004).  By comparison, Andino, Taylor and Koo (2005) using a partial equilibrium
world sugar model found that the combined 33% cut of intervention price and 15% cut in
production quota for EU sugar pushed the world sugar price up by 14.5%, a larger result reflecting
the higher drop in exports in the ATK study compared to our analysis.  Nevertheless these world
price increases need to be viewed as upper bound limits for at least two reasons. First, there is the
price-inelastic nature of sugar markets both on the supply and demand sides and second is the
simplifying assumption, typical in partial equilibrium models, that sugar is homogeneous and of the
same quality across suppliers and countries.  In addition, higher prices will trigger incentives to
increase sugar production, which would in turn create downward pressure on the world price.
Overall, while the PEATSIM shows a sharp rise in imports, it doesn’t separate out the import
sources. Moreover, being net trade, the model only deals with export subsidies implicitly. Therefore
to fully examine the implications of changing export subsidy policies and to directly examine the
trade implications by trading partner in light of preferential agreements, we now turn to the global
CGE model GTAP.
In our CGE analysis, the model scenarios are summarized in table 4. Starting from the initial
benchmark for GTAP database 6.5 for 2001, a preliminary projections scenario was carried out to
bring the world economy to 2004 and to implement the 2004 EU enlargement. Before we tackle the
implications of the new EU sugar regime, we first assess the impacts of the EBA Initiative. This is
followed by EU sugar reform scenarios under two alternatives: with or without the EU sugar14
production cut (of 15%) decided later by the EU Commission after the reform agreement. Finally,
we examine the implications of the reforms under two assumptions of competitive behavior: with or
without free entry and exit of sugar processing firms.
EBA Initiative Impacts
In the EU-EBA scenario, the European Union removes tariffs and quota restrictions on imports
of all goods (not just sugar) from the LDCs. This policy scenario is modeled to generate medium
term static effects with no additional investments (in processing capacity) and no new land brought
to agricultural use. Rather any changes in sugar production come strictly from reallocation of
existing land in agriculture. As expected, implementation of EBA results in a rise of imports from
LDC to EU by 473.1% compared to base (table 5) but EU sugar production is little affected (less
than 1% drop compared to base) as overall EU sugar consumption rises to absorb the added EBA
imports  (table 6). There is also some trade diversion away from non-LDC ACP regions to the
benefit of the LDC group. Under this scenario, the impact on third countries is very small but
countries restricted from exporting to the EU, such as Brazil, manage to channel some of their
exports via LDC and ACP (table 5).
Given the debate about the extent of increased EBA sugar exports to EU, we look closely at the
reported volume of sugar export increases from LDCs and perform a sensitivity analysis by varying
our assumption for the degree of production differentiation for sugar. Most partial equilibrium-
based analyses typically assume perfect substitution (homogeneity) for sugar, an assumption that is
hardly justified by econometric evidence and which assumes away any quality differences in sugar.
Moreover, the homogeneity assumption does not account for the difference between raw and
refined sugar in international trade.  The sensitivity analysis allows for a range of values for the
Armington trade elasticity of substitution (which reflects the degree of export demand elasticity)15
starting from the central value
2 and considering two extreme cases: lower trade elasticity (meaning
sugar is more differentiated between sources or production regions) and higher trade elasticity
(meaning sugar is more homogenous between regions). The quantitative results do not change
qualitatively except for the magnitude. EBA sugar exports to the EU range from 321% (highly
differentiated case) to 485% (homogenous case) (compared to 473% increase in the central case).
Van Berkum, Roza, Tengeren (VRT) (2005) also applied a CGE model to examine the impact of
the EBA initiative and found that LDC exports to the EU increase by 384,000 MT but that quantity
is raised to 0.9 million tonnes under a more homogeneous assumption. However, these results are
still much smaller than the EU Commission projections of 2.8 to 3.5 million MT of EBA imports by
2014 (EU Commission 2005).
EU Sugar Reform: industry impacts
From the new post-EBA benchmark data and to better isolate the economic effects of key
reform components we implement three scenarios representing the EU sugar reform for 2005.  In
scenario EU-Reform1, we implement the EU reform package as agreed to in November 2005. This
consists of cutting border tariffs with an amount equivalent to domestic price cuts plus a cut in
export subsidies to force total subsidized exports to comply with WTO ruling. In scenario EU-
Reform1Q, we implement both the reform package (in EU-Reform 1) plus the 15% production
quota cut (2.5 MMT) decided by EU Commission for 2006/07. Finally, in scenario EU-Reform1QE,
we rerun EU-Reform1Q by allowing EU sugar processors to enter and exit the industry as
production adjusts to EU reforms.
Under the base reform scenario (EU-Reform1, domestic price cut via border protection but
without quota production cut), the EU-wide output impact of the reform is relatively small (-3.2%)
and in a presence of binding production quotas, production actually doesn’t decrease for most EU
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Member States, except for France, Italy and smaller sugar producing regions (table 6). The producer
price drop is also small (-2.6%) despite a much larger drop in the sugar market price (-9.2%). The
differential between producer and market prices is linked to price wedges (“tax equivalents”)
stemming from the presence of production quotas (which create rent) and markups by oligopolistic
sugar firms both captured as “tax” wedges in the price linkages. The smaller drop in producer price
compared to market price stem from the offsetting “tax” effect of the production quota which
becomes more binding for some Member States.
Under the second reform scenario (EU-Reform1Q, with production quota cut), the impacts are
significantly different. Output declines by 14.3% over the EU-25 but the market price for sugar now
increases (+22.5%). The latter results arise from an increase in markups charged by firms and the
big drop in quota rents is reflected as “taxes” in producer-to-market price linkages. The producer
price as a whole drops for EU sugar while the market price rises.
    When entry and exit of firms is allowed for EU sugar firms (scenario EU-Reform1QE), the
impact of EU sugar reform leads to a significant exit of firms in the industry (greater degree of
restructuring) as the number of firms shrinking from 13 to 17% for 14 EU regions in the model
except for Italy (table 7). However for the remaining firms, sugar output either drops slightly
(Germany, Italy) or increases slightly (France, Netherlands). The remaining firms either maintain
existing production or slightly adjust production up or down depending on individual countries
within the EU. The main difference between this scenario and the scenario with no entry is that with
entry the overall producer price now rises (+2.9%) pulling the market price higher (+23.7%) as the
overall production at the industry level is down by close to 15% on average.
The comparison of the three reform scenarios, suggest that given the market structure of the sugar
industry in the European Union, direct cuts in production quotas combined with price support cuts
will have greater impact on EU sugar industry output adjustments than relaying only on price cuts17
alone. The quick decision by the Commission to mandate quota cuts for 2006/07 following the
reform may support this finding. Also the EU sugar reform effect on demand shows that the price
changes arising from EU sugar reform only result in small increases in EU sugar consumption
ranging from 1.1% increase under EU-Reform1 to -0.02% under EU-Reform1Q scenario as demand
for sugar is very inelastic in the EU. Even though we do not directly model sugar-Isoglucose
substitution in this general equilibrium analysis, this is unlikely to have much effect on the results
because the possibilities for substituting sweeteners for sugar remain limited in the EU
3. Other
studies also find little increase in consumption from cuts in sugar prices (Gohin and Bureau, 2005).
In terms of world price effects, the reform scenarios show relatively small changes in world
prices as a result of the EU sugar policy reform. Under scenario EU-Reform1, world price is
slightly down (-0.85%), as the scenario lead to smaller output changes, while the scenario EU-
Reform1Q (with production quota cut) sugar world price rise by 1.06% as EU sugar output and
trade adjustments are larger compared to the case without quota cut.  These magnitudes of world
price changes, though typically smaller than those typically reported by partial equilibrium models,
are consistent with the general equilibrium nature of the model due in part to the treatment of sugar
as differentiated product in world trade.
Trade and Income impacts
Trade effects reflect the combined impact of reducing export subsidy rates (to WTO compatible
levels) and reductions in border tariffs (necessary to bring about the same effect as support price
cut).  The volume of world sugar trade increases by 2.5% under EU-Reform1 scenario (no quota
cut) and by 14.5 % under EU-Reform1Q (with quota cut).  On the export side, the EU sugar exports
drop by 25.8% under the EU-Reform1 but the addition of quota cuts (EU-Reform1Q) lead to much
                                                
3 Unlike in the US where the soft drink industry rely heavily on High Corn Fructose Syrup, the EU soft drink industry
uses mainly saccharose but very little use of isoglucose, hence limiting potential substitutions with sugar.18
higher drop in sugar exports: -60.1%. On the import side however, EU sugar imports increase by
19.6% under EU-Reform1 and imports jump to 62.3% higher under EU-Reform1Q. The rise of
imports benefits mostly ACP countries which expand exports outside the sugar protocol as the
result of lower import barriers for out-of quota sugar. Since the reform scenarios start from a post-
EBA benchmark, LDC countries now already benefit from duty and quota free access, and therefore
see no additional benefits from lower border tariffs under the various reform scenarios. Rather LDC
countries see some contraction in exports to the EU as a result of trade diversion.
Among the non-preferential suppliers, there is some growth of exports from Brazil and Central
America but minimal change for Australia and Thailand whose exports are mostly concentrated on
Asian markets and since world price changes are not large enough to affect non-EU demand for
sugar. Gohin and Bureau (GB) (2005) using a general equilibrium model found that the impact of
the EU reform proposal including a removal of export subsidies lead to larger imports under MFN-
access and SPS but ACP exports are not affected.
In our study, income effects show that under the EBA-only initiative the LDC group as a whole
show significant income gains mostly as the result of tariff removal on non-sugar exports (since
initial sugar exports to the EU are relatively small compared to other commodities for LDCs). For
the European Union, the income loss is due mostly to the loss of tariff revenues in the wake of the
EBA initiative. However, under the EU reform package (EU-Reform1 and EU-Reform1Q
scenarios), this loss is turned into an income gain due to the interplay of several factors, including
lower prices for sugar, leading to lower cost for sugar using industries and consumers; contraction
of the sugar industry leading to reductions in deadweight losses in the form of rents; and reductions
in export subsidies. For preferential partners, there is some income loss under the EU reform
scenario due in part to lower quota rents from lower price received under the reform. In the case of
the ACP group the situation is only turned around into a positive income effect under the second19
reform scenario (EU-Reform1Q) where the production quota cut resulted in a much larger export
expansion overtaking the quota rent losses. Other exporters who increase their exports under EU
reform scenario 2 also show some income gains, but these are relatively small.
Conclusions
Up until 2005, the EU sugar policy regime escaped any attempts at reforms since it was first put in
place in 1968. The EU sugar policy has been criticized for distortions in the domestic and world
market, high consumer prices, and its adverse effect on certain developing countries.  However, the
EU sugar regime has recently become unsustainable due to the combination of several pressures
including the 2003 CAP reform (excluding sugar), EU 2004 enlargement, the EBA initiative and the
recent WTO-ruling against EU subsidized exports. The reform package was designed to lower
production incentives and to bring into line supply and demand in light of additional EBA sugar
imports and tighter constraints on exporting excess sugar with subsidies beyond WTO limits.  The
crux of the reform consisted of reducing the intervention price (by 36%); allowing for voluntary
quota buy out; reducing production; and refraining from exporting sugar beyond the WTO cap.
Moreover, immediately after the reform package was finalized, the European Commission
mandated a production quota cut of 15%. While reform measures like curbing export subsidies and
production quotas quota cuts have predictable effects on exports and production, the impact of the
intervention price cut is ambiguous given the sugar structure which results in market prices
consistently above intervention prices due a tacit collusive behavior of processors, a continued
restriction on sugar substitutes (despite an increase in quota under reform) and maintenance of high
protection duties restricting competition with imports.
Nevertheless, the reforms are expected to have significant impact on EU sugar production in the
near future. The inability to export excess out-of quota sugar will likely cut C-sugar production.20
However, since quotas continue to be distributed at the national level, the expected shift of
production from high cost regions to lower cost regions may not fully materialize.  On the other
hand, the trade implications of the EU reform are more nuanced and may be more significant for
current preferential exporters than non-preferential sugar players. The reduction of intervention
prices may have adverse effects on those developing countries that currently benefit from
preferential import access and receive the guaranteed EU domestic price. It is expected that within
the ACP group some countries may export less to the EU while others step in to fill the gap.
However, the EU Commission expectation of a significant surge of sugar imports from LDCs after
2009 is surrounded with lot of uncertainty as LDC countries are dependent on new investments in
sugar processing which are by no means guaranteed, given the price reduction in the EU and the
unstable environment in many LDC countries. For non-preferential exporters, the EU reform may
have limited impact since it doesn’t relax the high import barriers (outside preferential access).
Even with reductions in EU subsidized exports, the regional character of world sugar markets and
the limited effect on world sugar demand suggest a small effect of EU sugar reform on world prices.
Finally, what are the implications of the EU reform in light of the WTO Doha negotiations? The
reduction of export subsidies can bring the EU within the current WTO limits and could make it
easier for the EU to go along with a phased removal of export subsidies. In the area of domestic
support, cuts in intervention price and lower production means reduced AMS for the Amber box.
Moreover, classifying sugar payments as decoupled could also shift such support from Amber to
green. However, in the area of market access, the EU reform allows for a small margin to maneuver
in the context of multilateral tariff liberalization. The EU reforms and the fall of domestic prices
could make the special safeguard redundant. Moreover an equivalent cut in border tariffs may not
be enough to change the structure of sugar imports into the EU which will continue to be dominated
by preferential and not MFN-based sugar flows.21
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Figure 2
Market Prices by EU Member States
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Table 1
EU Sugar Industry (2002-03)
Number of Number of  Daily beet White sugar Sugar beet
factories companies tonnage yield yield  (t/ha)
(tons) (tons/ha) (ton/ha)
AUSTRIA 3 1 36.8 10.3 68.4
BELGIUM 8 6 81.3 10.4 66.0
DENMARK 3 1 29.4 9.3 57.1
FINLAND 2 1 12.6 5.3 38.6
FRANCE 34 17 391.0 11.6 77.5
GERMANY 28 7 292.6 8.8 58.9
GREECE 5 1 29.9 7.2 73.1
IRELAND 2 1 15.8 6.3 52.3
ITALY 20 9 141.4 5.7 51.8
THE NETHERLANDS 5 2 75.2 9.6 60.0
PORTUGAL 4 4 3.6 9.0 62.5
SPAIN 13 3 102.0 10.4 76.8
SWEDEN 2 1 24.4 8.0 48.5
UNITED KINGDOM 6 2 57.8 9.7 64.7
E.U. 15 COUNTRIES 132 56 1293.8 8.7 61.8
Production A sugar B Sugar C Sugar Sugar 
+ carry over consumption
(x1000 tons) (x1000 tons) (x1000 tons) (x1000 tons) (x1000 tons)
AUSTRIA 454 314 73 67 300
BELGIUM 888 675 145 68 530
DENMARK 501 325 96 80 230
FINLAND 166 133 13 20 210
FRANCE 4105 2789 752 564 2130
GERMANY 3798 2613 804 381 2080
GREECE 370 289 29 52 305
IRELAND 223 181 18 24 130
ITALY 1563 1311 162 90 1410
THE NETHERLANDS 953 684 180 89 625
PORTUGAL 56 56 . 320
SPAIN 1086 957 40 90 1220
SWEDEN 427 335 33 59 360
UNITED KINGDOM 1260 1035 104 121 2160
.
E.U. 15 COUNTRIES 15585 11697 2449 1705 12800
sources: CEFS delegations 25
Table 2
Comparing EU reform to status quo: EU production, consumption, trade, and price
effects.
Base EU Percent No  reform Percent
year reform change scenario change
scenario from base from base
Production 20.550 16.988 -17.33 20.550 0.00
Consumption 18.362 20.000 8.92 18.590 1.24
Exports 4.374 2.050 -53.14 4.310 -1.46
Imports 2.370 5.061 113.54 2.353 -0.72
Producer price 0.630 0.383 -39.22 0.563 -10.63
Consumer price 0.628 0.381 -39.25 0.562 -10.51
Export price 0.628 0.381 -39.25 0.562 -10.51
Import price 0.628 0.381 -39.25 0.562 -10.51
World price 0.199 0.215 8.04 0.196 -1.51
Source: PEATSIM Model runs (2006)26
 Table 3
GTAP Model scenarios
Experiment: Modeled policies and structural changes Starting Database
P0 (prelim Scenario) Growth projections 2001-2005 GTAP database 6 2001 
2004 European Union Enlargement: 
 (removal of interbal trade barrriers between EU15 and EC10) 
EU-EBA Elimination of all tariff barriers on imports from LDC countries Post-P0 2005 database
EU-EBA-S Same as EU-EBA with smaller trade elasticity: Post-P0 2005 database
 (sugar is imperfect substitutes)
EU-EBA-B Same as EU-EBA with large trade elasticity: Post-P0 2005 database
 (sugar is homogeneous across coutnries)
EU-Reform1 Reduction of export subsidy rates (to conform with WTO limits) Post-EBA database
Cut in border price by 36% (to parallel cut in domestic price)
EU-Reform1Q Reduction of export subsidy rates (to conform with WTO limits) Post-EBA database
Cut in border price by 36% (to parallel cut in domestic price)
Product quota cut by 15%
EU-Reform1QE Reduction of export subsidy rates (to conform with WTO limits) Post-EBA database
Cut in border price by 36% (to parallel cut in domestic price)
Product quota cut by 15%
Allow for firms' entry and exit in sugar processing industry27
Table 4
GTAP Model Results: EU Reform and changes in bilateral trade flows
Bilateral trade flows tn the intitial base 2004 (raw sugar equivalent in 2001 $US million):
Total Initial Of which to:
exports EU-25 ACP LDC Mediterran. USA South Asia Others
EU-25 1662.7 1299.1 13.1 40.1 70.0 33.0 61.2 146.2
ACP 2337.1 924.0 155.9 67.8 62.5 175.8 210.5 740.6
LDC 217.7 88.4 5.1 84.3 8.5 22.2 2.7 6.5
Brazil 1723.9 29.2 13.7 95.3 313.5 74.6 109.9 1087.8
C. America 944.2 31.9 41.9 9.3 9.7 239.7 119.2 492.5
India 241.5 43.4 0.3 28.6 8.9 2.7 37.2 120.5
Australia 852.2 0.7 3.1 0.0 32.2 51.1 535.6 229.5
Thailand 625.7 5.2 0.3 33.6 0.3 13.7 432.0 140.6
Others 1537.6 435.2 23.6 25.9 63.9 337.6 272.6 378.9
WORLD 10142.6
Change of sugar exports (raw equivalent) due to Implementation of EBA for LDC
Total f which to:
export change EU-25 ACP LDC Mediterran. USA South Asia Others
EU-25 3.7 -22.2 0.9 4.6 5.7 1.4 3.6 9.5
ACP -96.2 -100.3 -0.2 2.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9
LDC 402.7 404.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2
Brazil -3.2 -3.8 -0.1 2.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.9
C. America -3.8 -3.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6
India -2.0 -2.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Australia -1.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.3
Thailand 0.0 -0.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2
Others -36.7 -36.8 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
WORLD 263.4
Change of sugar exports due to post-EBA EU sugar reform (no production quota cut) 
Total Of  which  to:
export change EU-25 ACP LDC Mediterran. USA South Asia Others
EU-25 -129.4 -34.4 -4.6 37.3 -24.6 -16.3 -28.3 -58.4
ACP 363.5 368.2 0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -1.3 -0.1 -2.6
LDC -45.8 -45.6 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Brazil 36.7 31.1 0.2 -1.0 0.6 0.0 0.8 5.0
C. America 22.8 18.5 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.5
India 8.7 8.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6
Australia 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 4.4 1.0
Thailand 4.8 3.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.2
Others -30.7 -34.6 0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.4 2.0 1.3
WORLD 236.3
Change of sugar exports due to post-EBA EU sugar reform (including 15% production quota cut) 
Total Of  which  to:
export change EU-25 ACP LDC Mediterran. USA South Asia Others
EU-25 58.4 283.8 -7.9 -1.6 -45.2 -23.4 -44.2 -103.2
ACP 770.4 779.1 2.0 -1.5 -0.8 -3.0 -1.4 -4.0
LDC 9.3 8.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Brazil 59.8 38.9 0.5 -0.2 2.2 0.2 1.5 16.7
C. America 47.2 36.6 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.7 6.7
India 65.8 64.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.4
Australia 11.9 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 8.0 2.5
Thailand 11.6 8.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 2.9 0.4
Others 363.5 354.2 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.9 3.7 3.4
World 1397.8
Source: Model Simulation results28
Table  5
Summary of results: EBA and Reform scenarios (GTAP simulations)
Initial base EBA EU-Reform1 EU-Reform1Q
% change Value change
1 % change Value change % change Value change
($US Mi) ($US Mi) ($US Mi)
Imports into EU-25
TOTAL (Extra-EU) 1363.8 5.7 273.8 19.6 361.2 62.4 1170.3
 ACP          924.0 -10.9 -100.3 45.7 368.2 92.5 779.1
 LDC          88.4 473.1 404.0 -8.4 -45.6 1.6 8.8
 MEDTR        197.4 -8.7 -17.4 9.0 9.0 120.8 201.0
 USA          56.4 -7.8 -4.5 -11.8 -6.8 113.6 56.4
 CAN          18.7 -6.9 -1.3 -35.8 -6.4 60.8 11.0
 BRZL         29.2 -12.6 -3.8 123.7 31.1 155.8 38.9
 CHN          0.7 -8.6 -0.1 77.9 0.5 231.3 1.5
 IND          43.4 -5.5 -2.5 29.8 8.1 158.1 64.2
 AUS          0.7 -7.9 -0.1 11.2 0.0 143.8 0.9
 THLND        5.2 -7.8 -0.4 89.7 3.0 224.8 8.6
Exports from EU-25
TOTAL (Extra-EU) 183.2 7.1 14.6 -25.7 -19.6 -60.1 -97.0
 ACP          13.1 7.0 0.9 -34.4 -4.6 -58.2 -7.9
 LDC          40.1 11.5 4.6 83.2 37.3 -6.4 -1.6
 MEDTR        70.0 8.2 5.7 -33.7 -24.6 -61.6 -45.2
 USA          33.0 4.3 1.4 -48.1 -16.3 -70.1 -23.4
 CAN          5.1 7.7 0.4 -37.5 -2.0 -70.2 -3.8
 BRZL         3.3 5.3 0.2 -46.0 -1.6 -76.2 -2.6
 CHN          3.6 8.3 0.3 -39.4 -1.5 -67.5 -2.6
 IND          4.5 4.9 0.2 -26.4 -1.3 -48.8 -2.2
 AUS          5.2 8.3 0.4 -41.1 -2.2 -70.4 -3.8
 THLND        5.4 6.9 0.4 -46.8 -2.7 -71.5 -4.1
Output (raw sugar equivalent)
EU-25 26164.0 -1.0 -251.5 -3.2 -791.0 -14.3 -3653.3
 ACP          3981.6 -2.5 -98.8 9.6 374.0 20.4 792.6
 LDC          5322.2 7.6 403.2 -1.3 -73.0 0.3 14.4
 MEDTR        16358.7 -0.1 -23.1 0.2 32.5 1.7 269.2
 USA          32477.9 0.0 -8.6 0.0 12.5 0.4 121.5
 CAN          331.4 -0.5 -1.5 -1.9 -6.3 4.2 13.8
 BRZL         5800.6 -0.1 -4.1 0.8 45.1 1.3 74.4
 CHN          412.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 1.7 1.0 4.2
 IND          7171.9 0.0 -2.5 0.1 9.7 1.0 68.1
 AUS          2196.4 -0.1 -1.9 0.5 9.8 0.9 20.2
 THLND        1527.6 0.0 -0.3 0.5 7.1 1.0 15.7
Income (millions of 2001 USD)
EU-25 8988151.1 -317.2 1302.0 1600.7
 ACP          385024.0 -21.0 -19.1 79.9
 LDC          344329.3 362.9 -14.5 -8.3
 MEDTR        1178657.0 3.5 4.1 24.3
 USA          11057000.0 -39.6 -13.7 48.4
 CAN          780615.4 4.2 -2.3 7.4
 BRZL         595336.6 1.8 2.4 27.0
 CHN          1384773.0 -6.2 -2.3 -4.1
 IND          567009.9 -12.6 -1.7 10.4
 AUS          400031.3 5.8 -2.4 9.8
 THLND        142727.5 0.4 -2.4 5.5
 ROW          1310200.1 7.7 -3.5 -11.4
Sugar quota rent transfer by 1151.4 135.1 -478.6 -455.7
1: value change is expressed in constant 2001 US dollars
Source: Model simulation results29
Table 6
EU Reforms and market structure for EU sugar industry (GTAP Model results)
Change Change in  Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in 
in number  output per markups industry industry  exports imports regional 
of firms firm (%) (%) output (%) output ($US Mi) ($US Mi) ($US Mi) income ($US Mi)
EU-Reform1Q Scenario (No firm entry or exit)
Belgium 0 -15 4.51 -15 -226.9 -26.89 158.5 83.34
Denmark 0 -15 5 -15 -57.7 -4.07 106.4 4.71
Germany 0 -15 1.39 -15 -770.7 -31.93 1534.2 -55.24
Spain 0 -15 4.83 -15 -145.2 -17.06 223.2 32.4
France 0 -15 -0.82 -15 -487.9 -48.41 862.9 305.42
Italy 0 -2.1 0.02 -2.1 -27.7 -30.97 66.8 52.54
Netherlands 0 -15 1.91 -15 -108.5 -21.26 113.9 36.81
Austria 0 -15 5 -15 -66.9 -3.03 135.1 13.17
Poland 0 -15 4.6 -15 -862.6 -7.09 7398 -183.27
Sweden 0 -15 4.59 -15 -88.4 -5.64 138.8 -4.8
UK 0 -15 5.03 -15 -509.4 -12.58 366 884.73
Hungary 0 -15 4.77 -15 -44.7 -0.78 68.2 0.74
Czeck Rep 0 -15 4.54 -15 -132.8 -0.68 204.9 -28.55
Other-EU 0 -14.65 5.34 -14.65 -319.6 -17.97 460.3 458.7
EU-Reform1QE Scenario (with free firm entry or exit)
Belgium -15.42 0.5 0 -15 -228.7 -26.52 199.2 19.81
Denmark -15.15 0.18 0 -15 -57.8 -4.06 108.4 -10.27
Germany -13.64 -1.57 0 -15 -772.4 -31.85 1550.1 -117.53
Spain -15.05 0.06 0 -15 -145.4 -17.01 223.7 -7.85
France -17.33 2.81 0 -15 -489 -48.19 869.3 325.47
Italy -0.11 -1.86 0 -1.96 -25.9 -30.99 66.6 51.38
Netherlands -16.13 1.35 0 -15 -108.8 -21.15 116.2 25.75
Austria -15.15 0.18 0 -15 -67 -3.03 136.4 -6.61
Poland -16.11 1.32 0 -15 -890.2 -6.42 10064.2 -289.34
Sweden -14.88 -0.14 0 -15 -88.8 -5.62 144.5 -25.33
UK -14.96 -0.04 0 -15 -511.7 -11.24 413 727.48
Hungary -15.08 0.09 0 -15 -45 -0.76 71.5 -10.27
Czeck Rep -14.71 -0.34 0 -15 -134.3 -0.67 216.2 -55.02
Other-EU -14.18 -0.34 0 -14.48 -317.3 -17.71 472.4 343.96
Source: Model simulation results